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Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 108 S. Ct. 2225 (1988).
The most natural privilege of man, next to the the right of
acting for himself, is that of combining his exertions with
those of his fellow creatures and of acting in common with
them. The right of association therefore appears to me almost
as inalienable in its nature as the right of personal liberty. No
legislature can attack it without impairing the foundations of
society.'
I.

INTRODUCTION

While freedom of association appears almost inalienable in

its nature,2 the United States Constitution affords this right no
explicit protection.' Nevertheless, the right to associate with
those of one's choosing has emerged as a fundamental right deserving constitutional protection. 4 The freedom to associate,
however, is not an absolute right, but rather is limited by compelling state interests. 5 The eradication of discrimination has been
1 1 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 196 (P. Bradley ed. 1984).
2 Id.
3 See, e.g., Note, Discrimination in Private Social Clubs: Freedom of Association and
Right to Privacy, 1970 DUKE L.J. 1181, 1191; Note, Roberts v. United StatesJaycees: Does
the Right of Free Association Imply an Absolute Right of Private Discrimination?, 1986 UTAH
L. REV. 373, 373-74; Note, Roberts v. United States Jaycees: Discriminatory Mlembership
Policy of a National Organization Held Not Protected by First Amendment Freedom of Association, 34 CATH. U.L. REV. 1055 (1985).
4 In NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958), the United
States Supreme Court recognized that the right to associate emanates from the first
amendment and the liberties secured by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. While legal scholars no longer question the existence of this right, its
constitutional source remains an unresolved dispute. See Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression, 74 YALE L.J. 1 (1964).
Freedom of association continues to be recognized by the Court as a fundamental right. See, e.g., Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S.
87, 91 (1982); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 233 (1977).
5 See Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 107 S. Ct.
1940, 1947-48 (1987) (application of California's Civil Rights Act did not unconstitutionally hinder rights of private association); Roberts v. United States Jaycees,
468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984) (compelling state interests, which are unrelated to the
repression of ideas, may justify limitations on expressive association); Democratic
Party of the United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 124-26
(1981) (state's interest in preserving the electoral process is not sufficiently compelling so as to justify subordinating first amendment guarantees); Buckley v. Valeo,
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judicially recognized by a majority of the Supreme Court as such
a compelling interest properly subordinating the right to freely
associate. 6 Although private entities are not bound by constitutional constraints, organizations of a public nature are not permitted to discriminate against potential members based soley
7
upon immutable characteristics, such as race or sex.
The precise delineation between public and private institutions has been defined on an ad hoc basis by individual local
laws.' Challenges to these local laws have given the United
States Supreme Court several opportunities to expand upon and
424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (per curiam) (right of association may be demarcated by compelling state interests); Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 490 (1975) (selection of
applicants for national office is paramount to the state's interest in protecting its
electoral process).
6 See, e.g., Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 107 S. Ct.
1940, 1947 (1987) (California's compelling interest in eradicating discrimination
against women justified any infringement on first amendment freedoms); Roberts
v. United StatesJaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984) (Minnesota's compelling interest
in eliminating discrimination against female citizens outweighed any interest in first
amendment associational rights).
7 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1982). The Civil Rights Act of 1964 bars discrimination in "place[s] of public accommodation." Id. at § 2000a(a). Section 2000a(e),
however, provides an exemption for private organizations: "The provisions of this
subchapter shall not apply to a private club or other establishment not in fact open
to the public." Id. at § 2000a(e). While private entities may constitutionally discriminate "as a form of exercising freedom of association protected by the First
Amendment, .. . it has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections."
Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 470 (1973).
8 State anti-discrimination laws broadly define "public accomodations" thus allowing many social clubs to fall within the guise of a private institution. For instance, the California Civil Rights Act affords all persons access to full and equal
accomodations but nevertheless fails to delimit the scope of full and equal accomodations. The Act generally prohibits bars, restaurants and business establishments from discriminatory practices. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West 1982 & Supp.
1989). A similar Delaware provision defines public accomodation to mean "any
establishment which caters to or offers goods or services or facilities to, or solicits
patronage from, the general public." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6 § 4501 (1975 & Supp.
1986). New Jersey's Civil Rights section prohibits discrimination in any place of
public accommodation, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12(f) (West 1976), which is defined
as "any restaurant, eating house or place where food is sold for consumption on the
premises .. . or any auditorium, meeting place, or hall." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(0
(West 1976). The Act provides an exemption for public accommodations that are
in their nature "reasonably restricted exclusively to individuals of one sex," including, but not limited to gymnasiums, swimming pools and bathhouses but not including restaurants or places where alcoholic beverages are served. Id. at § 10:5-12
(f). The New York Human Rights law includes within its definition of places of
public accommodation restaurants and eating houses. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 292 (McKinney 1982). A similar Pennsylvania statute broadly defines public accomodations
to include taverns, roadhouses, hotels, buffets, barrooms and any place where food
is sold. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 954(1) (Purdon 1964 & Supp. 1989).
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refine the distinctions between public and private organizations. 9
The most recent discussion occurred in New York State Club Association v. City of New York, ' in which the Court evaluated the constitutionality of Local Law No. 63, a New York City ordinance
(Amendment), that precisely defined a public "institution, club
or place of accommodation.""
New York City's Human Rights Law (Law),' 2 enacted in
1965, prohibited discrimination by any "place of public accommodation, resort or amusement."' 3 The Law explicitly exempted
any organization essentially private in nature. 14 In 1984, the New
York City Council amended this Law.' 5 The Amendment's purpose was to enhance equal participation in business and professional opportunities for women and minorities.' 6 This enhanced
participation was facilitated by expanding the definition of a public organization to include many clubs which had previously enjoyed exemption under the 1965 Law as private institutions. 17 In
9 See, e.g., Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 107 S. Ct.
1940 (1987); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
10 108 S. Ct. 2225 (1988).
11 Id. at 2230 (quoting NEW YORK, N.Y., LOCAL LAW No. 63 of 1984, § 1, App.
14-15). The specific law in question was an amendment to New York City's existing
Human Rights Law of 1965. Id. The Amendment, Local Law No. 63, defines a
public accommodation as an "institution, club or place of accommodation [that]
has more than four hundred members, provides regular meal service and regularly
receives payment for dues, fees, use of space, facilities, services, meals or beverages
directly or indirectly from or on behalf of nonmembers for the furtherance of trade
or business." Id. (quoting NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(9) (1986)).
12 NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(2) (1986). The Human Rights Law
(Local Law No. 97 of 1965) provides in part:
[It shall be] an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being
the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation, resort or amusement, because of the race, creed, color, national origin or sex of any person
directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person
any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof
* ' . on account of race, creed, color, national origin or sex.
Id. New York City adopted this law shortly after the federal government's enactment of the Civil Rights Act in 1964. New York State Club, 108 S. Ct. at 2229-30.
13 Id. at 2229 (quoting NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(2) (1986)). The
Human Rights Law broadly defined this term to encompass, inter alia, "hotels, restaurants, retail stores, hospitals, laundries, theatres, parks, public conveyances, and
public halls." Id. (quoting NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(9) (1986)).
14 Id. Specifically, the exemption excludes from coverage " 'any institution, club
or place of accommodation which proves that it is in its nature distinctly private.'
Id. (quoting NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(9) (1986)).
15 Id. at 2230.
16 Id. See NEW YORK, N.Y., LOCAL LAW No. 63 of 1984, § 1, App. 14-15.
17 New York State Club, 108 S. Ct. at 2230. See NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8102(9) (1986).
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amending the'Law, the City Council recognized a compelling
state interest in protecting all of its citizens, regardless of race,
origin or sex, positing that women and minorities had not
achieved equal opportunities in the business world.'" The City
Council contended that valuable contacts and business deals
were frequently made within organizations that excluded women
and minorities.' 9 Consequently, the lawmakers concluded that
the state's interest in equal opportunity outweighed any interest
in private association asserted by club members.20
The Amendment declared that any institution exceeding
four hundred members which provided regular meal service and
received regular payments for dues from nonmembers in furtherance of business, did not qualify as a private institution.2 ' The
Amendment, however, specifically denoted religious organiza22
tions and benevolent orders as distinctly private.
18 New York State Club, 108 S. Ct. at 2230. The City Council stated:
It is hereby found and declared that the city of New York has a compelling interest in providing its citizens an environment where all persons,
regardless of race, creed, color, national origin or sex, have a fair and
equal opportunity to participate in the business and professional life of
the city, and may be unfettered in availing themselves of employment
opportunities. Although city, state, and federal laws have been enacted
to eliminate discrimination in employment, women and minority group
members have not attained equal opportunity in business and the professions. One barrier to the advancement of women and minorities in
the business and professional life of the city is the discriminatory practices of certain membership organizations where business deals are
often made and personal contacts valuable for business purposes, employment and professional advancement are formed. While such organizations may avowedly be organized for social, cultural, civic or
educational purposes, and while many perform valuable services to the
community, the commercial nature of some of the activities occurring
therein and the prejudicial impact of these activities on business, professional and employment opportunities of minorities and women cannot
be ignored.
Id. (quoting NEW YORK, N.Y., LOCAL LAW No. 63 of 1984, § 1, App. 14-15).
19 Id. The Council recognized the educational and social value of some clubs.
Id. The Council, however, found the commercial nature of some institutions prejudicial to women and minorities. Id.
20 Id. The Law, according to the Council, does not prevent clubs from selecting
members, only from denying membership to individuals solely on the basis of characteristics such as race or sex. Id.
21 Id. (quoting NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(9) (1986)). See supra note
11 (text of statute).
22 New York State Club, 108 S. Ct. at 2230 (quoting NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE
§ 8-102(9) (1986)). Religious organizations include corporations incorporated
under the religious corporation or education laws. Id. (quoting NEW YORK, N.Y.,
ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(9) (1986)). Benevolent orders are charitable institutions
formed under the benevolent orders law or incorporated under other state laws
conforming with the benevolent orders law. Id. (quoting NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN.
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The New York State Club Association (Association) 23 filed
suit to enjoin enforcement of the Amendment, attacking it as
facially invalid under both the first and fourteenth amendments
of the federal Constitution as well as challenging it on various
state grounds.2 4 Rejecting both the federal and state challenges,
the state trial court upheld the statute. 25 The intermediate appellate division affirmed with one dissent. 2 6 In a unanimous decision, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed, maintaining that
the pressing need for protecting women and minorities out27
weighed any violation of first amendment associational rights.
Moreover, the court of appeals stressed that the "Law employ[ed] the least restrictive means to achieve its ends because it
interfere[d] with the policies and activities of private clubs only
'to the extent necessary to ensure that they do not automatically
exclude persons from membership or use of the facilities on acdiscount of invidious discrimination.' "28 The court summarily
29
missed the equal protection claim without discussion.
The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdicCODE § 8-102(9) (1986)). Additionally, the City Council concluded that such orga-

nizations, regardless of size, did not conduct business regularly, hence such places
were essentially private. Id. (quoting NEW YORK, N.Y., LOCAL LAW No. 63 of 1984,
§ 1, App. 15).
23 The Association is a nonprofit corporation consisting of some 125 clubs located in New York. Id. at 2231.
24 Id. The Supreme Court's opinion focused only on the federal constitutional
issues and did not address the state claim. The state claim charged that the New
York City Human Rights Law, NEW YORK, N.Y., LOCAL LAW No. 63 of 1984 § 1,
App. 14-15, violated the "home rule" provision of the state constitution, N.Y.
CONST. art. IX, § 2(c), because it was inconsistent with the New York State Human
Rights Law, N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 290-301 (McKinney 1982). New York State Club
Ass'n v. City of New York, 69 N.Y.2d 211, 216, 505 N.E.2d 915, 917, 513 N.Y.S.2d
349, 351 (1987).
25 New York State Club, 108 S.Ct. at 2231.
26 Id. The appellate division affirmed the trial court's ruling in New York State
Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 118 A.D.2d 392, 505 N.Y.S.2d 152 (1986). There,
the dissent argued that the exception for benevolent orders violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment because it failed to yield equal protection to similarly situated individuals. New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New
York, 118 A.D.2d at 396, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 155 (Kupferman, J., dissenting).
27 iVew York State Club, 108 S.Ct. at 2231. (citing New York State Club Ass'n v.
City of New York, 69 N.Y.2d at 223, 505 N.E.2d at 921, 513 N.Y.S.2d at 355). The
New York Court of Appeals relied on the Supreme Court's holdings in Board of
Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club, 107 S.Ct. 1940 (1987), and Roberts v.
United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984). Id.
28 Id. (quoting New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 69 N.Y.2d at
223, 505 N.E.2d at 921, 513 N.Y.S.2d at 355).
29 Id.
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tion3 ° and thereafter affirmed the judgment of the New York
Court of Appeals. 3 ' The Court held that while the Association
had standing to challenge the Amendment's constitutionality on
behalf of its member associations, the legislation was, nevertheless, constitutional.12 Specifically, the Court found that on its face
the challenged statute violated neither the Association's private
associational rights nor each club members' expressive associational rights."
Additionally, the Court determined that the
Amendment did not foster an impermissible classification under
the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause.3 4
II.

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION:

A

FUNDANMENTAL RIGHT

While the freedom to associate has its roots in ancient philosophical thought,3 5 it was not until 1958 that the United States
Supreme Court interpreted the Constitution as implicitly endorsing the right to associate, or conversely, not to associate.
Specifically, freedom of association stems from the intricate nexus
linking the freedoms of speech and assembly.
As such, the
freedom to associate is viewed as essential to the guarantees reserved in the first amendment and embraced by the liberties secured in the fourteenth amendment:
A.

Formal Recognition of the Right to Associate

The United States Supreme Court formally established the
right to associate in large groups as an implicit fundamental right
in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson.3 ' The NAACP Court addressed the question of whether a state could constitutionally
compel the production of membership lists of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP).4 The
See 108 S. Ct. 62 (1987).
3 lNew York State Club, 108 S. Ct. at 2231.
'32 See id.
33 Id. at 2233-34.
'34 Id. at 2234-37.
35 See Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624 (1980) (discussing
association as an ancient philosophical principle).
36 See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
37 Id.
38 Id. See Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression, 74 YALE L.J. 1,
20-21 (1964).
39 357 U.S. 449 (1958). The Court had, however, referred to a constitutional
right of association in earlier cases. See, e.g., American Communications v. Douds,
339 U.S. 382, 400 (1950); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939); Sweezy v.
New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 265 (1957) (concurring opinion).
40 NAACP, 357 U.S. at 451. The NAACP was a nonprofit organization incorpo30
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Alabama Attorney General, acting under state law, sought to enjoin the NAACP from conducting business within the state4 and
moved for disclosure of the NAACP's membership lists. 4 2 The
NAACP argued that compelled disclosure would violate its members' right "to engage in lawful association" and that the state
had failed to show any compelling interest that would override
this fundamental right.4 3
Justice Harlan, writing for a unanimous Court, observed that
effective advocacy of controversial viewpoints is "undeniably enhanced by group association." 4 4 This logic, according to the Justice, stemmed from the intricate nexus linking the freedoms of
speech and assembly.4 5 The Court also recognized that the freedom to associate is an inseparable part of the liberty guaranteed
by the fourteenth amendment "which embraces freedom of
speech."4 6 The Court posited that compelled disclosure of membership lists would likely curtail the NAACP's advocacy of dissident beliefs.4 7 Additionally, Justice Harlan subjected the state's
rated under the laws of New York. Id. The organization's purposes, as stated in
their bylaws, was to promote equality of rights and to eradicate discrimination
against black Americans. Id. The NAACP acts through independent unincorporated groups. Id. at 452.
41 Id. at 451-52.
42 Id. at 451.
43 Id. at 460. The NAACP did not contend that the disclosure of these lists
would directly suppress associational rights, however, the NAACP argued that the
consequential effects would be to suppress a constitutionally guaranteed right. Id.
44 Id. See also Dejonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1936) (holding that the
concept of government implies a right of its citizens to gather for peaceful
consultations).
45 NAACP, 357 U.S. at 460. See also DeJonge, 299 U.S. at 364 (maintaining that
"[t]he right of peaceable assembly is a right cognate to those of free speech and
free press and is equally fundamental").
46 NAACP, 357 U.S. at 460. These liberties implicitly protected by the first
amendment, according to the Court, included speech, press, and association. Id. at
461. The Court held it "immaterial whether the beliefs sought to be advanced by
association pertained to political, economic, religious or cultural matters." Id. at
460.
47 Id. at 462. The Court observed that by sanctioning the type of disclosure
sought by the state, the Court would be approving a course of behavior which had
been shown in the past to adversely impact rank-and-file members. The Court
stated:
[Disclosure may subject members] to economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical coercion, and other manifestations of public
hostility. Under these circumstances, we think it apparent that compelled disclosure of petitioner's Alabama membership is likely to affect
adversely the ability of petitioner and its members to pursue their collective effort to foster beliefs which they admittedly have the right to
advocate, in that it may induce members to withdraw from the Association and dissuade others from joining it because of fear of exposure of
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purported interest in the membership data to strict scrutiny. 48
Deeming the state's interest as less than compelling, 49 the Court

upheld the NAACP's right to privacy in its membership lists. 50
B.

Expansion of Freedom of Association

In the decades following NAACP, the United States Supreme
Court struggled to define this newly recognized right and to deal
with its implications. Consequently, the Court has identified two
types of associational rights: "intimate" and "expressive." 5 1
i.

Intimate Association

In one line of decisions, the Court has defined intimate association as a "fundamental element of personal liberty." 5 The
Court consistently and vigilantly protects these highly personal,
intimate relationships against state interference. 5 3 This protection is predicated on the concept that such private relationships
foster "deep attachments and commitments to the necessarily
few other individuals with whom one shares not only a special
community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also distinctly personal aspects of one's life." 5 4 Intimate relationships
their beliefs shown through their associations and of the consequences
of this exposure.
Id. at 462-63.
48 Id. at 461. The state's purported interest in the membership list was to "determine whether petitioner was conducting intrastate business in violation of the
Alabama foreign corporation registration statute." Id. at 464.
49 Id. at 465. The Court recognized that the NAACP had already substantially
complied with most of the production order, and therefore, there was no showing
of absolute necessity. Id.
50 Id. at 466.
51 Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 107 S. Ct. 1940,
1945 (1987); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984).
52 See, e.g., Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618.
53 Id. at 617-22. The types of relationships protected by the Court are familial in
nature, such as, marriage, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-86 (1978);
cohabitation with relatives, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S.
494, 503-04 (1977); bearing and begetting children, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs.
Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-86 (1977); child rearing and education, e.g.,
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
54 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620. The Court noted that the ability to "define one's
identity . . .is central to any concept of liberty." Id. at 619. See, e.g., Quilloin v.
Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978); Smith v. Org. of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816,
844 (1977); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-86 (1977); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974); Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645, 651-52 (1972); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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center upon a "high degree of selectivity" and smallness in size. 55
In assessing the limitations of state authority over an individual's
associational rights, the Court has specifically examined the relationship's objective characteristics "on a spectrum from the most
intimate to the most attenuated of personal attachments. '56 The
intimate relationships typically protected by the first amendment
include "marriage, procreation, contraception, family relation57
ships, and child rearing and education.
58
For example, in 1965, the Court in Griswold v. Connecticut
held unconstitutional a Connecticut statute that prohibited the
dissemination of contraceptive information to married persons.5 9
In reaffirming the right to marry as one of fundamental importance, the Court expanded the right of association established in
NAACP to include, not only political associations, but social relationships as well.6 °
Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, commented that marriage "is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a
harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty; not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a
purpose as any involved in our prior decisions,'
and is protected by the fundamental rights of privacy and association included in the peripheral first amendment guarantees. 6 According to the Court, without these "peripheral rights the specific rights [enumerated] would be less secure. "63
55 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620. Specifically, the Court has recognized such factors as
"size, purpose, policies, selectivity, [and] congeniality" as essential in defining intimate associations. Id.
56 Id. (citing Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 187-89 (1976) (Powell, J.,
concurring)).
57 Id. at 631 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976)). See also supra note 53 and accompanying text.
58 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
59 Id. at 485. The two statutes involved provided that "[a]ny person who uses
any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception
shall be fined not less than fifty dollars or imprisoned not less than sixty days nor

more than one year or be both fined and imprisoned." CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.

§ 53-32 (repealed 1969). The other statute provided that "[a]ny person who assists, abets, counsels, causes, hires or commands another to commit any offense
may be prosecuted and punished as if he were the principal offender." CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 54-196 (repealed 1969).
60 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483-86. See generally Douglas, The Right of Association, 63
COLUM. L. REV. 1361 (1963) (discussing Griswold as it relates to the freedom of
intimate association).
61 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486.
62 Id.
63 Id.

at 484-86.
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Two years later in Carey v. Population Services International,64
the Court similarly invalidated a New York law that restricted the
distribution of contraceptive devices to individuals over sixteen. 65 In extending the right to privacy to include minors as
well as adults, Justice Brennan declared that "It]he decision
whether .
to beget or bear a child" is a fundamental right deserving constitutional protection.6 6
Moreover, the Court in Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio ,67
invalidated a zoning ordinace that strictly limited the occupancy
68
of a home to members solely belonging to one nuclear family,
thus expanding the right of intimate association to include cohabitation with non-immediate family members. 69
ii.

Expressive Association

Expressive association, unlike intimate association, affords
protection to group activity designed to advocate shared beliefs
and controversial viewpoints.7 0 This fundamental right, as guaranteed by the Court, preserves "political and cultural diversity"
7
by allowing a citizen to associate with those of one's choosing. '
Infringements on expressive associational rights may be justified
by overriding governmental interests "unrelated to the suppression of ideas," tailored sufficiently narrow to achieve the desired
ends. 72 The government may seek to limit these rights by compelling disclosure of membership lists7 3 or by interfering with the
internal structure of membership organizations. 4 The latter
type of infringement has pervaded the Court's analysis with respect to associational freedom in recent years.7 5 Most challenges
center on antidiscrimination laws designed to alleviate discrimi431 U.S. 678 (1977).
Id. at 682.
Id. at 685.
431 U.S. 494 (1977).
Id. at 499.
Id. at 502-06.
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984).
71 Id. See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 907-09 (1982);
Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 231 (1977).
72 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623. E.g., Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign
Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 91-92 (1982); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (per
curiam).
73 See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
74 Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 107 S. Ct. 1940
(1987); Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623. E.g., Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 487-88
(1975).
75 See, e.g., Rotary, 107 S. Ct. 1940 (1987); Roberts, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
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nation in organizations, particularly in all male social clubs. 76
In 1984, the Supreme Court in Roberts v. United States
78
Jaycees,7 7 dealt with the Minnesota Human Rights Act (Act)
by any place of public accommowhich prohibited discrimination
dation on the basis of sex. 79 The national organization of the
Jaycees, contrary to the Act, permitted women in the clubs as
only associate members.80 Consistent with the Act, but adverse
to organizational policy, two local chapters admitted women as
regular members. 81 The national organization subsequently notified the local chapters that a motion to revoke their charters, in
accordance with the national bylaws, would be considered at an
upcoming meeting.8 2 Consequently, both local chapters filed
complaints with the Minnesota Department of Human Rights
against the national organization alleging discrimination. 8 1 Confronting the issue of whether a state could, consistent with the
first and fourteenth amendments, directly interfere with an organization's membership policies, Roberts answered in the affirmative. 8 4 Justice Brennan first discussed the right of intimate
association, positing that this right protects only relationships of
a highly personal nature.8 5 The Court then determined that the
76

Id.

77 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
78 MINN. STAT. § 363.03. (West 1982). The Act states in part: "It is an unfair
discriminatory practice: To deny any person the full and equal enjoyment of the
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of a place of
public accommodation because of race, color, creed, religion, disability, national
origin or sex." Id. at subd. 3.
79 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 614-15. A " 'place of public accommodation' is defined in
the Act as 'a business, accommodation, refreshment, entertainment, recreation, or
transportation facility of any kind, whether licensed or not, whose goods, services,
facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations are extended, offered, sold, or
otherwise made available to the public.'" Id. (quoting MINN. STAT. § 363.01, subd.
18 (West 1982)).
80 Id. at 613. Women were allowed as associate members while men aged eighteen to thirty-five were admitted to regular membership. Id. Associate members as
distinguished from regular members, could not vote, hold office or participate in
leadership activities. Id.
81 Id. at 614.
82 Id.
83 Id. Specifically, the local chapters contended "that the exclusion of women
from full membership required by the national organization's bylaws violated the
Minnesota Human Rights Act ..... Id.
84 Id. at 612. The conflict addressed by the Court required a balancing of competing interests-"a [s]tate's efforts to eliminate gender-based discrimination
against its citizens and the constitutional freedom of association asserted by members of a private organization." Id.
85 Id. at 618. The Court posited that the Bill of Rights ensured liberty as fundamental, affording personal relationships sanctuary against the state. Id. See, e.g.,
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local chapters of the Jaycees were not the type of "intimate rela-

tionships" afforded constitutional protection because of the
clubs' large and nonselective nature and because their daily activities regularly involved the participation of strangers." 0
Justice Brennan also acknowledged that the right to associ-

ate with others in pursuit of political, social and educational ends
could be constitutionally protected by the first amendment. 8 7

However, the Court placed limitations on expressive associations, observing that "[i]nfringements on that right may be justified by regulations adopted to serve compelling state interests,
unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved
through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms."'8 8 The Court espoused the view that the state's compel-

ling

interest

in

eliminating

discrimination

justified

any

infringement on the Jaycees' associational rights.8 9 Determining
that organizations must make a substantial showing that the admission of unwelcome members would alter the association's
message, Justice Brennan charged the Jaycees as failing to meet
this burden. ° Thus, the majority concluded that the admission
of women as regular members would not impede the Jaycees' expressive right to disseminate its preferred views. 9 '
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262

U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
86 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620-21. The majority indicated that theJaycees employed
no selective criteria for judging new applicants and regularly admitted members
with no investigation into their backgrounds. Id. at 621.
87 Id. at 622. See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 907-09,
932-33 (1982); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 231 (1977).
88 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623. See, e.g., Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign

Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 91-92 (1982); Democratic Party of United States v. Wisconsin
ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 124 (1981); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976)
(per curiam); Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 487-89 (1975); American Party of
Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 780-81 (1974); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438
(1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 486, 488 (1960).
89 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623. The majority upheld the Act as consistent with federal legislative efforts designed to eliminate discrimination. Id. at 624-26. The
Court contended that the Act employed the least restrictive means to achieve its
ends. Id. at 626. Additionally, Justice Brennan stated that the Jaycees failed to establish that the Act imposed any serious burdens on the male members' associational rights. Id. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 81 (1984) (Powell,J.,
concurring) (concluding that a law firm failed to demonstrate that the admission of
women to partnership status would hinder preferred views).
90 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 626. Justice Brennan advocated that the Act imposed no
restrictions on the exclusion of women members with contrary views. Id. at 627.
91 Id. at 627. The Court rejected the idea that admission of women as full voting
members would hinder any "symbolic message" conveyed by theJaycees. Id. Furthermore, the Justice opined that "[i]n any event, even if enforcement of the Act
causes some incidental abridgment of the Jaycees' protected speech, that effect is
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In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor, parted with the
Court's analysis but, nonetheless, agreed with the majority's
holding.9 2 The Justice contended that the Court "adopted a test
that unadvisedly casts doubt on the power of States to pursue the
profoundly important goal of ensuring nondiscriminatory access
to commercial opportunities in our society."' 9 3 Justice O'Connor
took issue with the majority's fashioning of a burden of proof
that required the Jaycees to demonstrate that opening its membership to women would substantially change its public
message. 94 The Justice posited that the test should not focus on
"what the association says or why its members say it," 95 but
rather should distinguish expressive from commercial organizations. 96 This approach, according to the Justice, would insure an
organization engrossed in purely first amendment endeavors
protection for both the content of speech and the selection of its
members while yielding minimal protection to primarily commercial activities.9" Justice O'Connor also acknowledged that because application of the proposed test might prove to be difficult,
relevant considerations in assessing commercial versus expressive activities should include the purposes of the organization
and its members' reasons for belonging.9 8
Three years later in Board of Directors of Rotary International v.
Rotary Club of Duarte,99 the Court rejected Justice O'Connor's test
and reaffirmed the Roberts' analysis when it upheld California's
Unruh Civil Rights Act' 0 0 which barred sex discrimination in all
no greater than is necessary to accomplish the State's legitimate purposes." Id. at
628. The Court also rejected the overbreadth and vagueness claims. Id. at 629-31.
92 Id. at 631 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Justice O'Connor agreed with the majority's conclusion that a "295,000-member
organization whose activities are not 'private' in any meaningful sense" is not the
type of relationship afforded associational protection. Id.
93 Id. at 632. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice O'Connor further advocated that the Court afforded insufficient
protection to expressive associations while placing inappropriate burdens on organizations claiming first amendment prtection. Id.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 633. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
96 Id. at 634. (O'Connor,J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
97 Id. at 634-35. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
98 Id. at 636. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
99 107 S. Ct. 1940 (1987).
100 CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West 1982). The Unruh Civil Rights Act provides in
part: "All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no
matter what their sex ... are entitled to the full and equal accomodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind
whatsoever." Id.
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state business establishments. '0 ' Rotary International (International) was an organization of business and professional men who
provided "humanitarian service, encourage[d] high ethical standards in all vocations, and help[ed] build good-will and peace in
the world."' 0 2 The Rotary Club of Duarte was a California affiliation belonging to the national membership corporation. 0 3 Rotary Club of Duarte admitted women to active membership in
contravention of International policy.'0 4 Consequently, International revoked Duarte's membership charter and terminated its
membership.'0 5 Thereafter, two women members and the local
Duarte Club filed suit alleging that International's policy of excluding women from active membership violated the Unruh Civil
Rights Act.'o 6
The Supreme Court first rejected International's contention
that the male-only membership rule represented an intimate associational choice of a highly personal or private nature. 0 7 Justice Powell based the Court's holding on the size of the clubs, the
fact that members were encouraged to bring strangers to the
meetings and because the clubs were encouraged to publicize
their activities, thereby keeping their "windows and doors open
to the whole world."' 0 8 Additionally, the Court held that Rotary
101 Rotary, 107 S. Ct. at 1945.
102 Id. at 1942 (quoting Rotary Manual of Procedure 7 (1981) App. 35). Rotary
International admitted members according to a classification system which served
the avowed purpose of ensuring "that each Rotary Club include[d] a representative
of every worthy and recognized business, professional, or institutional activity in
the community." Id. at 1943 (quoting 2 Rotary Basic Library; Club Service 67-69,
App. 86)).
103 Id. Individual members belonged to a local Rotary Club which in turn belonged to Rotary International. Id.
104 Id. Active membership in Rotary Clubs was limited to men. Id. (citing Standard Rotary Club Constitution, Art. V, § 2, Record 97). Women could however
"attend meetings, give speeches, and receive awards." Id. According to the testimony of the Secretary of Rotary International, this policy promoted an " 'aspect of
fellowship . . . that is enjoyed by the present male membership.' " Id. (quoting App.
to Juris. Statement G-52) (deposition of Herbert A. Pigman, General Secretary of
Rotary International).
105

Id.

106 Id. The trial court held for International, concluding that neither International nor the local club were business establishments within the meaning of the
statute. Id. at 1944. The California Court of Appeals reversed holding both affiliations' business organizations subject to the statute. Id. The Supreme Court of California "denied appellants' petition for review." Id. at 1945.
107 Id. at 1946.
108 Id. at 1946-47 (quoting 1 Rotary Basic Library, Focus on Rotary 60-61, App.
85). TheJustice stressed that there was no limit to the number of members admitted into any Rotary Club. Id. at 1946 (citing Rotary Manual 139, App. 61-62). Specifically, the clubs ranged "from fewer than 20 to more than 900." Id. (citing App.
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Clubs did not meet Roberts' definitional test of an expressive association because there was no showing that the clubs' purposes
would be thwarted by the admittance of women.'0 9 The Court
concluded by stating that "[e]ven if the Unruh Act does work
some slight infringement on Rotary members' right of expressive
association, that infringement is justified because it serves the
State's compelling interest in eliminating discrimination against
0
women."11
III.

DEFINING THE PARAMETERS OF A PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION

It was against this background of defining intimate and expressive associations deserving constitutional protection that the
Court in New York State Club Association v. City of New York,"' up-

held a New York City ordinance that expressly listed three characteristics for defining a public accommodation. 1 2 Writing for a
unanimous Court, Justice White first addressed the issue of
standing.'1' The Court examined the requirements necessary to
have standing under the federal Constitution." 4 Specifically,
Justice White relied on Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising

Commission."' Rejecting the city of New York's interpretation of
Hunt, the Court reaffirmed that "an association has standing to
sue on behalf of its members when those members would have
standing to bring the same suit. ''116 Noting that each individual
to Juris. Statement G-15) (deposition of Herbert A. Pigman, General Secretary of
Rotary International).
109 Id. at 1947.
110 Id. (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (per curiam)).
'''
108 S. Ct. 2225 (1988).
112 Id. at 2230-31.
113 Id. at 2231.
114 Id. at 2232. The Court noted that the state trial court addressed the issue of
standing and neither appellate courts raised the issue on appeal. Id. at 2231 n.2.
An independent determination of standing was necessary, according to the Court,
due to the imposition of the special requirements imposed by Article III of the
federal Constitution. Id. The Court recognized, however, that states were free to
determine their own procedural law and could issue advisory opinions. Id.
115 432 U.S. 333 (1977). In Hunt, the Court stated:
[A]n association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members
when: (a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their
own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.
Id. at 343. See also Automobile Workers v. Brock, 477 U.S. 274 (1986).
116 New York State Club, 108 S. Ct. at 2232. Specifically, the Court rejected the
city's argument that the phrase, "would otherwise have standing to sue in their own
right" meant that the member associations were required to have standing "only on
behalf of themselves, and not on behalf of anyone else, such as their own individual
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member club suffered an immediate or threatened injury to their
associational rights as the result of the Amendment's enactment,
Justice White concluded that the Association had standing to
challenge the Amendment. "7

The Court then moved to the underlying constitutional issues, rejecting the Association's facial challenge of the Amendment." 8 Justice White observed that a facial challenge could
succeed only if the Association could show either that the
Amendment could never be applied in a valid manner or could
demonstrate that, although valid as to itself, the Amendment was
so broad that it might impair the first amendment rights of third
parties not before the Court." 9 In holding that the first test was
not satisfied, the Court pointed out that the Amendment could
constitutionally be applied under either an "intimate" or "expressive" analysis found in prior decisions." 2 justice White
noted that government restrictions on groups with large memberships and those clubs which regularly interacted with nonmembers had previously withstood
constitutional scrutiny in the
2
Roberts and Rotary decisions.' '
The Justice agreed with the city's contention that clubs providing regular meal service and which regularly received payments "directly or indirectly from or on behalf of nonmembers
for the furtherance of trade or business," were commercial in nature and, therefore, not private associations. 22 The majority
quoted with approval the City Council's finding that clubs with
members." Id. (quoting Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S.
333, 343 (1977)).
117 Id. (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975)).
118 Id. at 2233.

119 Id. Noting that the latter challenge was an exception to ordinary standing
requirements,Justice White opined that the challenge would be justified only when
the threatened or potential use of the law inhibited speech as easily as the actual
use of that law. Id. (citing Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98 (1940)). Asserting that both exceptions were narrow, Justice White stated that each and every application of the law must create "an impermissible risk of suppression of ideas." Id.
(quoting City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 798, n.15 (1984)).
Moreover, the Justice maintained that the statute must be "substantially" overbroad yielding a realistic danger that the law will "significantly" compromise first
amendment guarantees of persons not before the court. Id. (citing Taxpayersfor
Vincent, 466 U.S. at 801).
IV2 Id. The Court observed that appellants conceded this fact at oral argument.
Id. (citing Tr. of Oral Arg. 11-12).
121 Id. Justice White stressed that this Amendment covered only clubs exceeding
400 members, whereas, associations with as few as 20 members were held not protected in Rotary. Id.
122 Id. (quoting NEw YORK, N.Y., Admin. Code § 8-102(9) (1986)).
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these characteristics are places "where business deals are often
made and personal contacts valuable for business purposes, employment and professional advancement are formed."' 12 3 Thus,
Justice White determined that the commercial nature of the institutions as defined by the second and third parts of the Amendment excluded the clubs from constitutional protection as private
24
intimate associations. 1
The Court also held that a club member's right of expressive
association was not impinged. 1 25 While noting that the ability to
join with others was protected by the first amendment and that
advocacy of controversial viewpoints was enhanced by group association, Justice White emphasized that constitutional protection of a club member's "selective process of inclusion and
exclusion" was not absolute.' 26 The majority distinguished the
Amendment, holding that it did not prevent advocacy of ideas or
association based on shared beliefs. 127 Instead, the Court noted
that the Amendment merely forbade using racial or gender clas128
sifications as a sole basis for determining membership.
The Court next addressed the contention that the Amend12 9
ment was overbroad in reaching truly distinct private clubs.
The majority emphasized that the overbreadth doctrine mandates that the Association demonstrate "from the text of the Law
and from actual fact that a substantial number of instances exist
in which the Law cannot be applied constitutionally."' 13 0 Justice
White stated that the Association failed to identify any club
whose members' associational guarantees would be substantially
123 Id. (quoting NEW YORK, N.Y., LOCAL LAW No. 63 of 1984, § 1, App. 15).
While noting private association does occur in these settings, Justice White opined
this "fact alone does not afford the entity as a whole any constitutional immunity to
practice discrimination when the Government has barred it from doing so." Id. at
2233-34 (citing Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78 (1984) (holding that
application of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex, did not violate a law partnership's guaranteed rights of
association)). Thus, the Court concluded, although some clubs would be entitled
to protection, Local Law 63 does not infringe upon the private associational rights
of every club member. Id. at 2234.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id. (citing Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 68, 78 (1984); Norwood v.
Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 470 (1972); Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88, 93-94
(1945)).
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Id.

1989]

NOTE

263

impaired by application of the Amendment. 13 ' He also rejected
the argument that the Amendment erected an irrebuttable presumption that all clubs affected by the Amendment were not distinctly private. 13 2 The Justice reasoned that constitutionally
guaranteed judicial review of appeals from administrative proceedings assured that any overbreadth under the statute would
be cured on a case-by-case analysis. 13 3 Accordingly, the majority
sustained the Amendment against the Association's overbreadth
challenge. 3' 4
The Court then determined that the Amendment's exemption for religious and benevolent corporations did not violate the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 3 5 Justice
White noted that, because the amendment in no way significantly
affected constitutionally protected fundamental interests, heightened scrutiny did not apply.' 36 The Justice reasoned that the
Council exempted religious and benevolent organizations because those groups "ha[d] not been identified in testimony
before the Council as places where business activity [was] prevalent."' 13 7 Justice White, in upholding the Council's classification
scheme as rational, explained that it was reasonable for the State
to assume that such groups were organized along private, noncommercial lines, and therefore, were different from the affected
clubs. 1'
The majority recognized that the equal protection
clause mandates that "all persons similarly situated should be
treated alike."' 39 The Court, however, also stressed that challengers of "the legislative judgment must convince the court that
the legislative facts on which the classification is apparently based
could not reasonably be conceived to be true by the governmenId. at 2234-35.
132 Id. at 2235.
133 Id.
134 Id.
35 Id.
136 Id. See also Lyng v. Int'l Union, UAW, 108 S. Ct. 1184, 1188 (1988) (statute
did not directly and substantially interfere with the right to associate).
137 New York State Club, 108 S. Ct. at 2235-36. (quoting NEW YORK, N.Y., LOCAL
LAW No. 63 of 1984, § 1, App. 15). The Court in New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63 (1928), sustained a New York law exempting benevolent orders from filing documents which most corporations had to file, finding that the
legislative exemption "was justified because benevolent orders were judged not to
pose the same dangers as other groups." Biant, 278 U.S. at 73-77.
138 New York State Club, 108 S. Ct. at 2236.
139 Id. at 2236 (quoting Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center Inc., 473 U.S. 432,
439 (1985)).
131
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tal decisionmaker."' 40 - The Court observed that legislative classifications are presumed constitutional and that the Association
had failed to prove the statute unconstitutional.' 4 ' Justice White
stressed the city's contention that a rational basis existed for the
exemption of these organizations due to their non-commercial
nature. 4 2 Accordingly, a unanimous Court affirmed the lower
43
court's holding.1
In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor, joined by justice
Kennedy, acknowledged that the Court's opinion in no way undermined the importance of any first amendment associational
rights. 14 4 Justice O'Connor posited that, while the majority's decision reaffirmed the state's power to eradicate discrimination,
the right of association was also an important right deserving
protection.14 5 The concurrence applauded the Amendment as a
sensitive tool designed to balance the two fundamental interests
46
at stake.
Justice O'Connor stressed that the three prongs of the
Amendment were not exclusive. 4 7 The Justice noted that the
court below had held that the three factors were to be considered
in conjunction with other relevant facts, such as "size, purpose,
policies, selectivity, congeniality and other characteristics. "148
Justice O'Connor reiterated the majority's point that because an
association could demonstrate that it qualified for constitutional
protection under an "intimate" or "expressive" analyses using
49
the above factors the statute was not facially unconstitutional.
Justice Scalia wrote separately to express his disagreemnet
with the majority's equal protection analysis. 5 ' He first noted
the Court's assumption of a "constitutional right of private association for other than expressive or religious purposes."' 5 ' Justice Scalia then rejected the majority's conclusion that a rational
basis for the exemption existed simply because benevolent orId. (quoting Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 111 (1979)).
Id.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 2237.
144 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
140

141

145 Id.

Id.
Id.
148 Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S.
609, 620 (1984)).
149 Id. at 2237-38. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
15o Id. at 2238. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
151 Id.
146

147
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ders were unique. 152 A plausible connection, according to the
Justice, must link the organization's uniqueness with-the intentions of the Amendment. 5 3 Justice Scalia pointed out that all
associations qualifying as benevolent orders were in essence
lodges or fraternal organizations. 15 4 Thus, the Justice attested
that "[a] lodge is not likely to be a club where men dine with
On these grounds, the Justice
clients and conduct business. "155
56
held the exemption rational.
IV.

CONCLUSION: IMPACT OF LOCAL LAw

63 AND AN APPRAISAL

In New York State Club Association v. City of New York,'

57

the

Court undertook the difficult task of deciding which of two competing interests was to prevail. In affirming the Amendment as
facially valid,'5 8 the Court properly sacrificed the right to associate with those of one's choosing to the state's compelling interest
in eradicating discrimination. Thus, Alexis de Tocqueville's renowned premise that began this article has been compromised by
the Court's recognition of the59 changing role that women and minorities play in our society.'

Discrimination against women and minorities has plagued
the the business world for decades. Particularly, discrimination
has permeated traditional all male social clubs where men gather
to enjoy time "away from the office" but nevertheless engage in
business deals. Consequently, as the New York City Council
aptly noted, women and minorities have enjoyed far less business
60
opportunities and have made few too many business contacts.1
In an effort to alleviate the onerous burden and disadvantages facing these groups, several cities have followed New
York's lead by enacting similar statutes designed to eradicate discrimination in all male social clubs, including Los Angeles, San
Francisco, Chicago and the District of Columbia.' 6 ' Moreover,
the American Bar Association (ABA) has similarly stressed that
152
153

Id.

158
159

Id. at 2231.

Id. The Justice posited that equal protection analysis does not require a perfect fit, merely a reasonable connection. (citing Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 108
(1979)).
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 108 S. Ct. 2225 (1988).
See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
160 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
161 E.g., CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE ch 199A; Los

ANGELES,

C.A.,

MUN. CODE
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attorneys and firms should no longer conduct business activities
in private clubs that employ such discriminatory practices. In162
deed, the ABA has recently passed such a resolution.
While the Court in New York State Club had no choice but to
uphold the Amendment,163 the Court nonetheless leaves ajar the
possibility that these laws will undoubtedly be both over and
under inclusive. 164 For example, a 400 member club in New
York City is not nearly as likely to be "public" as is that same club
in a small midwestern town. Therefore, by focusing on such factors as size, these statutes may constitutionally protect clubs that
are in essence public in nature while at the same time prohibit a
distinctly private club from protection under an expressive
analysis.
Perhaps the Court should have adopted the test suggested
by Justice O'Connor in her concurring opinion in Roberts. In Roberts, Justice O'Connor argued that the test embraced by the
Court "unadvisedly casts doubt on the power of States to pursue
the profoundly important goal of ensuring nondiscriminatory access to commercial opportunities in our society." '6 5 She then
posited that the test should distinguish expressive from commercial organizations and should not focus on "what the association
says or why its members say it. "166 Relevant factors in such a
proposed test, noted the Justice, would include the purposes of
the organization and the members' reasons for belonging, not
§§ 44.95.00-44.95.04; SAN FRANCISCO, C.A., POLICE CODE, §§ 3300BI-3300B.7;
WASHINGTON, D.C. CODE § 1-2502.
162 ABA HOUSE OF DELEGATES RESOLUTION, 10 G (August, 1988).
163 The Association attacked the Amendment as facially invalid under both the
first and fourteenth amendments of the Constitution. New York State Club Ass'n v.
City of New York, 108 S. Ct. 2225, 2231 (1988). In order to prevail, the Court
required that the Association demonstrate that every club with over four hundred
members was in fact private. Id. at 2233. This burden was indeed impossible due
to the Association's concession that some of its members were within the purview

of the Amendment. Id. In addition, the Association could have prevailed if the
Amendment was so broad as to impair the expression of ideas of third parties not
before the Court. Id. Again, because the Association had no facts concerning even
their own club members, this was an impossible task. Indeed, as Justice White
stated: "We could hardly hold otherwise on the record before us, which contains
no specific evidence on the characteristics of any club covered by the [Amendment]." Id. at 2234 (emphasis in original).
164 Indeed, this possibility was foreshadowed by Justice O'Connor in her concurring opinion in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 632 (1984)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). See supra note
93 and accompanying text.
165 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 632 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
166 Id. at 633 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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such a useless factor as size. Although justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in New York State Club did not directly refer to this
test, she did emphasize the dominant theme-that the
right to
16 7
associate depends on the nature of the organization.
New York State Club is, nonetheless, a logical extension of the
Roberts and Rotary decisions. In Roberts, the Court recognized that
its past decisions had referred to two constitutionally protected
rights of association.168 Intimate association, according to the
Court, preserves those relationships that are truly private in nature. 169 Intimate association is therefore not a right to invidously
exclude select groups from public accommodations where those
accommodations solicit the business of strangers. As correctly
inferred by the Court, these organizations do not fall on the spectrum of the most intimate relationships afforded constitutional
protection.
Further, the Court in New York State Club appropriately concluded from the evidence before it that the Amendment did not
prevent groups from assembling for the purposes of engaging in
constitutionally protected speech.' 70 Freedom of expressive association, as acknowledged by the Court in Roberts and Rotary
protects an organization only when the organization's purposes
would be thwarted by the admittance of members with contrary
views. Because the organization offered no evidence to support
the proposition that the admittance of unwelcome members
would in fact thwart the clubs' purposes, the decision is no surprise. Indeed, the New York State Club decision has finally implemented a powerful means for terminating the oppressive
conditions in the marketplace.
Deanna Lynne Mueller
New York State Club, 108 S. Ct. at 2237 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
468 U.S. 609, 617 (1984).
Id. at 618-19. The right of intimate association is closely related to the right
of privacy. See also Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 107
S. Ct. 1940, 1945-47 (1987).
170 New York State Club, 108 S. Ct. at 2234.
167
168
169

